Why vote? Sidney Gendin.

Full Text: COPYRIGHT 2001 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

I do not vote. Never have. Never will. When I tell people I never vote they react with dismay and disbelief. "What? Never vote? Absolutely shocking. It is your duty as a citizen to vote. Why it is better to vote for anyone than not to vote at all. What would happen if everybody behaved as you do? It is even possible that your vote might make a crucial difference." Ad nauseum.

It is important to distinguish the claim that voting, generally speaking, is a good thing from arguments intended to establish that it is wrong for any given person not to vote. It may be that it is a good thing that most persons vote. I will not consider that claim although a few things I have to say bear on it. Moreover, to restrict my claim and make more plausible the arguments in its behalf, I mention at the outset that I refer only to presidential and senatorial races. I have no idea whether these arguments apply to smaller contests but neither does it matter because the standard righteousness of pro-voters is usually reserved for major elections and almost no one is indignant about anyone's failure to vote in elections for dogcatcher or congressmen. With this caveat in mind, we see readily that, on the whole, arguments against any one person's not voting are pure drivel and unexamined cliches that, thank goodness, no sensible person really believes hold water. The common ones are:

1. A rhetorical appeal to "What would happen if everybody refused to vote?"

2. An "argument" that voting is not so much an individual right as it is a collective responsibility.

3. A misguided and historically inaccurate claim that high voter turnout is very important to democracy.

4. A mathematically perverse notion that any one individual's vote may make a crucial difference.

WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF EVERYBODY REFUSED TO VOTE?

The fundamental appeal of this question derives from the curious idea that one should never act in a way which would cause a disaster if others acted the same way. For the argument to have force you cannot say that here it applies and here it doesn't, for its whole point is to show that actions, seemingly innocent in themselves, cannot be rationally universalized. Moreover, it should not be employed where it is unnecessary. Consider these examples of actions that should not be universalized: robbing banks, raping, murdering, shoplifting. What would happen if everybody went around doing these things?

Please note that, in each case, the proffered example is an act that is wrong even when done in small quantities. Not only are these awful when universalized, they cannot be tolerated when they happen with serious frequency. What would happen if even 20% of the population engaged regularly in shoplifting? The straightforward answer is that life would be too awful to contemplate.

Obviously, if you begin with something that is terrible then more of the terrible is even more terrible. You don't need, nor should you resort to, arguments from generalization or universalization to explain why rape, robbery and murder are beyond the pale. The power of the question "What would happen if...?" is that it supposedly shows a single act of refraining from voting is a serious mistake.

The question is not a real question asking for information, but a rhetorical device. It seems to presuppose that all sensible persons will see that not voting is unacceptable when looked upon from this hypothetical point of view, but it does not contain any argument why one should look upon non-voting from this hypothetical point of view.

There is a very good reason why we ought not to judge isolated actions from the hypothetical point of view, for the question "What would happen if...?" defeats any and all innocent actions a person might consider. If this is so, then something is wrong with the question, reducing it to absurdity. (A reductio ad absurdum, as philosophers like to say for fear that ordinary persons don't understand English.) Suppose I want to be a dentist. You can show this choice of career is a mistake by asking what would happen if everyone took up this profession. Nor may I refrain from being a dentist because in that case, too, the consequences would be disastrous. What would happen if nobody were a dentist? Dare I eat a potato tonight? Well, think about it. For that matter, dare I not eat a potato? Pity the poor farmer if everybody behaved as I propose behaving. Of course, all this is silly. There may be good reasons why some people eat potatoes or become dentists or farmers, but these reasons do not establish that those wh o refrain from these tasks are committing a moral blunder. "What would happen if...?" is superfluous in the case of rape and conceptually odd in the case of dentistry. I confess that while a single instance of rape is terrible, the same is not true, say, of shoplifting. Still, even a single case of it is at least a teeny weeny wrong. If not, why the fuss? It is not that shoplifting is wrong only if there is an epidemic of it, although it is a terrible wrong only if there is an epidemic. Now, if you already do know that my not voting is a terrible thing, independent of whether others do vote, then you needn't trot out the "What would happen if...?" argument any more than you appeal to such a strange argument to persuade me not to rape. Simply explain without beating around the bush why my not voting, in the instant case, is plainly misbehaving.

Surely people should behave realistically. We see this clearly in the case of dentistry. A person may become a dentist because he knows not everyone else is planning to be one. He understands it would be a disaster if everyone chose this profession but this should play no role in his decision. Similarly, I may refrain from voting because I know not everyone else is planning to refrain.

A commonplace but mistaken retort to this is as follows: if I am entitled to reason that since many others will vote no harm is done by not voting, then everyone else may reason in the same way. This is perfectly true but lacks forcefulness for precisely the same may be said in the case of dentistry or not eating a potato. If I am being "unfair" by saying "Don't worry; others will vote" I am equally unfair when I refuse to be a dentist and remark, "Don't worry; others will become dentists." There is a point to the "What would happen if...?" argument but, generally speaking, it is misapplied. I will discuss its proper application in the next section.

THE ARGUMENT FROM COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY

In many cases, a worthwhile project cannot be accomplished unless everybody pitches in. In other cases, it suffices if nearly everybody pitches in. In other cases yet, a group project can be adequately managed so long as just a few do their share. Often, there is a threshold that cannot actually be determined. This might be the case if a community needs to ration water during a drought. So long as "many" do their share then the freeloaders don't do a bit of harm. But since we do not know how much cooperation is required, nor whom we can count on, it is wrong for anybody to say he is entitled to use his water as freely and extravagantly as he chooses since not everybody will do the same. Although the contribution of any one single person is not necessary, the failure of one person to do his share may increase, if ever so slightly, the burden on others to make up for freeloading. Worse yet, since it is certain that many will freeload, the burden is increased even more on the cooperators. Thus, that the cooperat ors eventually succeed in their goal is no excuse for the freeloaders to say, "See, I told you so. No harm done by not joining in."

The argument that we have collective responsibility depends upon the fact that burdens are involved. They are lightened for all when all pitch in. This is not the right model for voting. Voting is not a burden. One person's not voting does not increase the share of voting for anybody else. Moreover, if it did, the "burden" would be no burden but would be welcome. "One man, two votes" is profiteering, not onerous, for the recipient of the "task." If I knew I'd get an extra vote for each person who refuses to vote, I'd be empowered and would happily mount a secret campaign to discourage as many others from voting as I possibly could.

The argument from collective responsibility depends on the fact that some obvious goal may be defeated altogether by the non-cooperation of many people. Wherever the generalization argument is effective it may be modestly expressed as "What would happen if very many people behaved as you propose to behave?" In the case of voting it isn't clear what would happen if very many people refrained from voting. To use the argument we would, at the least, have to redefine the meaning of "very many" in a way that is inconsistent with contemporary facts in order to make it plausible. In the United States, roughly half of those eligible to vote for President don't vote. Yet the United States is a successful democracy not on the verge of collapse. We have to conclude that "half the eligible voters" does not meet the threshold of "very many." Determining the consequences of large scale behavior patterns is always difficult and I rather doubt that defenders of voting have in mind the collapse of democracy or anything else q uite so dramatic. What do they even suppose would happen if only 30% of eligible voters voted? Apart from the fact that is never easy to determine the consequences it is also not easy to evaluate consequences once they are determinable. Had Gorbachev and Yeltsin not come to power in the U.S.S.R. very likely communism would not have collapsed--at least not so suddenly as it did. How do we evaluate that? Fools and TV pundits evaluate; wise men don't. It is a safe bet that if voter turnout in the U.S. fell to 30% some things would begin to occur that are different than if turnout rose to 75%. It is a safer bet that nobody has any really good idea whether the changes that each of these states of affairs would produce would make for a better world.

A crucial difference between the objection to freeloaders and the objection to non-voters involves the clarity and specificity of the respective goals. The water rationers may or may not believe in the broad value of cooperation. The general value of cooperation is not what they are preaching in the immediate circumstances. The proper place for that preaching is in this journal. (But only if accompanied by sophisticated argument, of course!) In the actual circumstances, the rationers have an aim that is clear and identical for all, independent of a philosophical thesis. On the other hand, those who want non-voters to vote seem to have two aims--to get some particular persons elected and to preach the value of high voter turnout regardless of who is elected. Plainly these may not always be reconcilable. The high-minded goal of high voter turnout is altogether too nebulous for rational people to prefer to the election of the best candidate.

HIGH VOTER TURNOUT

What can high voter turnout tell us with respect to what the people want from any candidate who wins? Some writers believe they, in the fashion of psychic readers, can read off an amazing amount of information from high voter turnout. In the years 1934-36, the Supreme Court struck down many of FDR's New Deal programs. After his election in 1936, FDR unsuccessfully attempted his famous court-packing scheme. According to Bruce Ackerman, FDR received a "mandate" from the people to reinstate his programs via the scheme. (1) The "consensus" FDR achieved was, by Ackerman's lights, a new way to amend the Constitution. I will not discuss whether a "consensus" or "mandate" from the American people is a legitimate way to amend the Constitution (although, frankly, it seems no way at all). Instead I wish to point out that the professor is a bit mathematically challenged. Roosevelt received a remarkably high 62% of the vote, and voter turnout was relatively high, as these things go---57%. Cross-multiplying shows that 35% of the eligible voters voted for Roosevelt. Let us make the generous (albeit ridiculous) conjecture that 95% of those who voted for Roosevelt did so to show support for his struck down New Deal programs. Thus, fewer than one-third of the American people voted for Roosevelt on the grounds that Ackerman thinks establishes a "mandate." If voter turnout had been a wildly high 70% and had FDR received an astounding 70% of that turnout then he would have gotten 49% of the vote of all Americans eligible to vote. No one preaching the value of high voter turnout has such high hopes. In general, when we remember to cross-multiply voter turnout by the percentage of the vote the winner gets, it is always safe to conclude we cannot read off the secret intentions of the people.

Unless you hold the view that the United States is among the least democratic nations in the west, you cannot make too great a fuss about the compelling importance of high voter turnout. In the case of most of our allies, voter turnout is much higher than here in the United States. Voter turnout has been getting lower in recent years but there has been no obvious decline in our democratic institutions. "High voter turnout" is a high-minded phrase full of bombast but signifying nothing.

Far from being important, higher voter turnout might even be contrary to the best interests of democracy. The mere insistence that people should vote ignores the how and why of their voting. Indeed, if high voter turnout were essential to democracy then, paradoxically, it ought to be legally required. However, voting is a right (and perhaps even a privilege), and the right to vote implies the right not to vote. It would be paradoxical to force people to vote since force is paradigmatically undemocratic.

I want now to show why nobody believes high voter turnout is a value in itself. Consider the elementary truth that every rational person prefers intelligent voting to ignorant voting. Ignorant voting, taken to a bizarre extreme, must outrage rational persons even more than not voting. Vicious voting is even more appalling than ignorant voting. Consider the following scenarios:

(A) I don't know who the candidates are, much less their views on any issues. Since I am very short, I vote for the candidate whose lever is easiest to reach.

(B) Not caring a hoot about the candidates but, having received a couple of tickets to a baseball game from a precinct captain, I vote for the candidate the captain prefers.

(C) Suspecting candidate A is a bigot who secretly hates Jews I vote for him in the hope that if he is elected he will try to set up extermination camps.

What rational grounds are there for thinking democracy is better served by such voting than having such persons stay home? When people bemoan low voter turnout and say it is better to vote for anyone than to stay home would they be consoled upon learning that the higher turnout was derived from such factors as (A) through (C)? I think not and certainly hope not.

The obscure meta-goal of having high voter turnout may conflict with the clear first-order goal of getting a certain person elected. The first-order goal ought to be anyone's priority. What comfort can it be to a person if the candidate he prefers is defeated merely because his opponent mounted an expensive, vicious, mendacious campaign that persuaded many persons, who otherwise would not have bothered to vote at all, to vote for the person he perceives to be far less qualified? But whatever the pros and cons of this claim may be, why should an advocate of high voter turnout be annoyed at my not voting without at least ascertaining whom I might have voted for?

Some political theorists may claim that declining voter turnout relieves government from its responsibility to the people. (2) If put precisely this way and taken literally, this is false, plainly and uncontroversially. It is a bit like saying that if a mother has a very unruly child that relieves her of responsibility for his welfare. Perhaps they mean that elected officials will feel relieved of responsibility. Well, what of it? It may be of some interest, I suppose, to political scientists but that some officials may feel this way has no bearing on the points I am making, to wit, that nothing is gained by increasing voter turnout because of mistaken notions concerning extermination camps or voting because they get bribes. Even if these political scientists are right this speaks only to the fact that some elected officials have a depraved sense of their job. It isn't even the beginning of an argument for why I, as one particular person, should vote. In any case, why should we believe even this reduced claim about responsibility? How can evidence be adduced in behalf of this view? Certainly not by polling politicians who will emphatically deny it. I conclude that teeth gnashing over low voter turnout is bad for the gums and that the dangers of low voter turnout are mythical.

I have been told that intelligent persons who are dissatisfied with all the candidates should protest by means of a write-in vote. There is no evidence whatsoever that votes for Mickey Mouse, Napoleon, Betsy Ross, or Sidney Gendin collectively or individually reveal citizenry dissatisfaction better than simply staying away from those infernal machines. Even if voting for Mickey Mouse is a better way, why is it wrong to express my unhappiness by staying away? Apart from the fact that we have no good way to determine the best form of protest, the main issue is not "What is the most efficient way for Sidney Gendin to protest?" but whether it is morally wrong for Sidney Gendin not to vote. I await a convincing argument why it is morally better (not merely more efficient) to vote for Mickey Mouse than not to vote at all.

It is exceedingly odd that the virtue of voting is preached only in the context of presidential elections. Even when senatorial elections coincide with a presidential election, the total vote for the would-be senators falls short of the total for the presidential candidates. Yet no hue and cry is raised. Invariably, the total vote for the job of state assemblyman falls below the total for the senatorial candidates. Indeed, if the total presidential vote is unusually high, the voters will be praised even if the total vote for all other offices and all proposals that may be on the ballot is unusually low. Why oughtn't the lament over low turnout apply to those cases, too? Often, the proposals concern very pressing matters and, in any case, have an immediate and obvious impact that is lacking in the choice between presidential candidates.

Suppose I vote, but never for whom will be the next dogcatcher, taking comfort in the thought that others will. Consistency demands that you frown on this, too. You should point out that everyone is free to reason the same way, and therefore I am making a serious mistake. The fact is that you don't. If I tell you I don't know who would make the best dogcatcher you will probably think it is good I didn't vote. You will think it is no virtue that I should vote ignorantly, and you may also think there is a good chance I would have voted contrary to what I actually wanted. Worse, there is a chance I would have voted contrary to what you want. On a dogcatcher election, my vote might just possibly make a difference. You should be glad I didn't vote contrary to how you voted, even if that meant my not voting at all. You may think I ought to have acquainted myself with the issue but that is separate from the question whether I should vote given that I have no idea concerning the merits of the candidates. Considered a ll by itself, the goal of "high voter turnout" is a fraudulent ideal.

YOUR VOTE CAN MAKE LITTLE DIFFERENCE

Quite simply, it can't. It won't. To think otherwise is romantic drivel. The Florida fiasco is proof enough of this and not at all a counterexample. Had I lived in Florida and voted for David McReynolds (the rather obvious best choice for President),3 Mr. McReynolds would still have lost. McReynolds' name was well positioned, immediately below Buchanan's on the notorious butterfly ballot, but that advantage still left him significantly behind Harry Browne and several others.

No large-scale election-president, senator, governor-in any state of the Union has been decided by a single vote. (I am unreliably informed there have been exceptions to this in the case of elections to the U.S. House of Representatives although I am unable to confirm even that much on my own and my Torquemada-like critics provided no examples.) Now it is important not to try to refute my claim that my vote won't make a difference by means of the "Can't others say the same thing?" tack. Yes, others can say the same thing. What has this to do with the price of tea in China? I am not spending millions of dollars preaching to others not to vote. I am not setting an example for others. That others can say the same thing is independent of my choosing not to vote. My not voting has no causal impact on what others do. (Of course, if I write a paper on the subject and distribute it widely, it might have impact, but I doubt it.) Some persons who vote actually worry that their vote will make the difference. They do not appeal to theoretical arguments about responsibility or "What would happen if...?" They simply worry. Some people care not a whit about the effect on democracy if they vote or not. Instead, they worry and, upon hearing a false report that their favored candidate has won (or lost), turn around and go home. For these people, it is not a matter of wanting to participate in a high voter turnout nor do they ask "Can't others say the same thing?". They vote because they are mathematically challenged and worry that everything depends upon them. The reader knows they are wrong.

SOME PERSONAL REMARKS ADDRESSED TO THE NON-DOGMATIC

As it happens, no candidate is interested in the major social issue of the day--"What is the proper way to treat animals?". (4) Now, I may be mistaken about thinking this is the most important issue of our times but so may anybody be about what he thinks is most important. I take consolation in the fact that Mahatma Gandhi agreed with me, ranking the treatment of animals above working for the freedom of his people. In his words, "The greatness of a nation and its moral progress can be judged by how its animals are treated." Apart from this, I will offer no defense for this view. The reader knows there is an abundant literature on the matter.

I have another reason for not voting that supplements the main two ("makes no difference to the outcome" and "not concerned for what I regard as the most important issue") and that is that I share Dwight MacDonald's witty viewpoint when he wrote that the difference between Democrats and Republicans is the difference between Tweedledum and Tweedledumber. Only I would extend this observation to the candidates of the Reform, Green and other parties. None of the declared candidates has a plan remotely appealing to me. I am unable to pick out "the lesser evil." If you belong to a political party you probably think the different parties have different platforms but, for my part, only under an electron microscope can I detect differences. Consider just one of my beliefs: taxes on social security should not be limited to the first $70,000 or so but should extend to all income, and the taxes should be graduated just as income tax is. Then, those who contribute the most should not be eligible for any of it. Having a su fficiently high retirement income, they would receive nothing in return for their helping others. ("From each. . . and to each..."; you all know the maxim.) I feel very strongly about this but even David McReynolds, the Socialist, doesn't support it. (5)

My views on other issues are yet more radical. For example, I believe hunting and trapping should be instantly made illegal and that medical experiments on animals should be phased out. Every president we have ever had has extolled the red-blooded American sport of hunting, and every candidate for president swears that his gun control plan will exempt fine upstanding pursuers of squirrels. No candidate we are likely ever to have wants an end to medical experiments. All such persons strike me as hopeless cases. Hence, why ought I to vote even if all my theoretical arguments about my not voting are wrong? Actually, it does not mater whether I am right or wrong about social security or hunting for it is of the essence of democracy that we not only permit but encourage goal pluralism. Respect for pluralism requires not only deference to a variety of voting alternatives but to the alternative of not voting. I would not be scornful of citizens who Stayed away in droves from the voting booths if the principal issue before the American public excited me as none other ever had but bored them to tears. Each of us has issues we prize above all others, and it would be senseless to cast a vote when those issues do not get addressed, particularly keeping in mind that no single vote will make a difference to the outcome.

ON STRATEGIC VOTING

Some voters reason that since some minor candidate, call him N, has zero chance of winning they shouldn't vote for him even though they perceive him as clearly best. Voting for N would be worse than a wasted vote; it might cause "the wrong candidate," as they define the term, to win. This reasoning is utterly perverse. The right way to try to avoid the "wrong candidate" from winning is to campaign strenuously against him. Among other things, one must contact the thousands of potential N supporters who are worrying you and influence them to vote for "second best." Having done that, no harm comes from secretly voting for N anyhow. Your single vote for N is trivial as compared to all the hard work you have already done to defeat the "wrong candidate." You will have done all in your power, quite literally, to produce the result you want. Refraining from an N vote will not make an iota of difference.

But what truly makes perverse the complaint about voting for the person you concede may be the best candidate is that it flies in the face of all the worn-out slogans for voting. After all, what would happen if everybody refused to vote for the candidate he deemed best? Why should I not trot this argument out against those who employ it against me? And if I don't vote for N on the grounds that he won't win, shouldn't I also point out what they think they can hold against me, namely the "Can't others say the same thing?" argument? It is queer to trot out these slogans on some occasions but not all. It is also strange to trot out the silly "I don't want to waste my vote" theory when it comes to not voting for N since it wrongly presumes that those who refrain from voting for N must then choose the candidate you think they must regard as second best. Furthermore, I am unaware that anybody has argued that it is impermissible to vote for a Republican in a Teddy Kennedy district on the grounds that it is a wasted v ote. Did anyone claim that one who lives in Texas wasted his vote by voting for Al Gore? The "wasted vote" view is exposed immediately as absurd when one realizes that it implies voting for any candidate who will surely lose is wrong. After all, the "wasted vote" argument applies to major parties as well as it does to minor ones.

Recently, Ralph Nader was criticized for running President on the grounds that a vote for him was a vote Al Gore probably would have received and, thus, a vote for George Bush. It is true that if every vote for Nader in Florida had gone to Gore, Mr. Gore would have won the election. What of it? It is equally true that Nader would have won the election had all votes for Gore gone to him. Wickedly, and deliciously, I ask "What would happen if everybody who thought Nader was superior to Gore voted for Gore instead?" What would happen is precisely what did happen, Mr. Bush emerged triumphant. Those who engage in strategic voting, frightened by the prospect of the "wrong person" winning have just as much reason for uniting behind the "outsider." If it is unrealistic to think the "outsider" has a change, well, then, that is true only as a self-fulfiling prophecy.

It is good to remember the Electoral College and the winner-take-all way in which the American system works. One's strategic vote, even if it were effective, could influence only the outcome in one's home state. It is simply false that my vote would influence the outcome in my state and even on the magical outside chance that my vote would make the difference it remains unlikely that it would influence the overall result.

I am not a fan of strategic voting but point out to those who are that it probably requires an end to the secret ballot (which actually is a good idea). The secret ballot may have had its point once upon a time but the dangers that accompanied revealing one's vote no longer exist. The value of the unsecreted vote is apparent. At least the value of the loud proclamation of whom one intends to vote for is apparent. If I tell students for whom I will vote they will be influenced by that, holding me as they must, in the very highest regard for my political acumen. As it is, almost everybody is happy to participate in exit polls. Why not entrance polls? Secrecy influences nobody. The caster of the secret ballot is rather like the nonvegetarian who nobly refrains from eating veal or pate de foie gras. His efforts are too few and come too late. "Tis a far, far better thing to campaign strenuously for the candidate of one's choice and then secretly remain at home and not vote than not to campaign but to go out in the rain, vote, and catch cold." I think those were Mr. Dickens' exact words. Many voters are in the absurd position of having helped bring about a situation in which they dislike the two so-called major candidates and then, preferring someone else altogether, vote for one of the two they dislike.

The right strategy for those who want to make a difference is to campaign vigorously prior to the primaries. If voting is worthwhile, then the time to vote is during the primaries where one's vote has at least a dismal chance of impact, rather than no chance. I know altogether too many people who, shocked though they may be at my never voting in the "big one," hardly ever vote in primaries, especially when it is raining hard. To rephrase a bit, "Start the election without me." As for me, having no stake in the outcome, I stay home, rain or shine.

ADDENDA

It is commonly said that those who refrain from voting have no right to complain about how the country is governed. This is clearly false. Since it is one's legal right not to vote and one doesn't lose citizenship for exercising that right, neither does one lose the right to complain. That much is guaranteed by the First Amendment. Appended to the notion that one shouldn't complain is the idea that others need not care about your complaints. But people should care if you have an intelligent criticism. If you don't have an intelligent criticism then the fact that you voted is worthless. What matters is what you have to say, not your credentials. People who do not listen to rational criticism are foolish and hurt themselves.

I cannot resist pointing out that no person can seriously believe that each presidential race produces one of the two persons of all Americans most qualified to be President. It strains credulity to believe that even Abraham Lincoln (or whoever is your personal favorite) ranked among the five thousand persons most qualified to be President. The reason why one restricts one's choice to the presented candidate is because it is assumed that those who are more qualified but not a candidate of either the Republican or Democratic Party have no realistic chance to win. Fans of realism should never again use the "What would happen if everybody... ?" argument.

Since I regard myself as vastly superior to any of the declared candidates for President in the year 2000, (it does not matter whether I am right or wrong) ought I to have cast a write-in vote for myself? Probably, if I was to vote at all. If you think I am very tempted to naughtily reply, "What would happen to this country if everybody thought that way?"

NOTES

(1.) See Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Volume 1, Foundations (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1991).

(2.) "May" is the operable word. A referee for this journal suggested this view is held by the political scientist, Walter Dean Burnham. In a search of the hundreds of articles by Burnham on the subject of low voter turnout I am unable to find anything he says that is put quite this way.

(3.) Here and elsewhere I offer a few audacious-sounding opinions for which I offer not a shred of evidence. Support for these would take me off on long tangents. This paper is about why I justifiably do not vote and not why I think McReynolds was the best candidate, why social security taxes should be revamped or why animal welfare is more important than a strong nuclear defense.

(4.) Please re-read footnote 2.

(5.) Private communication with author.

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